Policymakers in developing countries have increasingly pinned their hopes on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in order to improve their chances in the worldwide competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). However, the effectiveness of BITs in inducing higher FDI inflows is still open to debate. It is in several ways that we attempt to clarify the inconclusive empirical findings of earlier studies. We cover a much larger sample of host and source countries by drawing on an extensive dataset on bilateral FDI flows. Furthermore, we account for unilateral FDI liberalization, in order not to overestimate the effect of BITs, as well as for the potential endogeneity of BITs. Employing a gravity-type model and various model specifications, including an instrumental variable approach, we find that BITs do promote FDI flows to developing countries. BITs may even substitute for weak domestic institutions, though not for unilateral capital account liberalization.
Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are widely perceived to be superior to other types of capital inflows. Apart from offering additional investment resources, FDI may help host countries foster economic development by offering access to internationally available technologies and managerial know-how, rendering it easier for the host countries to penetrate foreign markets, and making them less prone to sudden reversal of flows in times of crisis. At the UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002, Heads of State and Government propagated the view that FDI provides an important means to eradicate poverty in developing countries. According to the Monterrey Consensus, the central challenge is to overcome the concentration of FDI in few (large and relatively advanced) developing countries so that poor countries would be able to reap the benefits of FDI (UN 2002) .
Hence, it is not surprising that policymakers in almost all countries are engaged in fierce competition for FDI inflows. However, it has remained disputed as to how effective the means are that national policymakers have at their disposal when attempting to attract FDI.
Major driving forces of FDI (e.g., the size and development of host country markets, the endowment of local factors of production, and geographical and cultural proximity to major source countries) are largely beyond the realm of short-term policymaking. This may explain why policymakers have increasingly pinned their hopes on two sets of measures: (i) unilateral regulatory changes and incentives such as opening up previously restricted industries, removing foreign ownership restrictions, promotional efforts, and tax and fiscal inducements; and (ii) bilateral agreements through which host country governments commit themselves to binding obligations, e.g., concerning the entry of foreign investors, post-entry regulations, profit remittances and dispute settlement.
In this paper, we focus on the effectiveness of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in stimulating additional FDI inflows. The few empirical studies addressing this question have produced highly ambiguous results (Section 2). We suspect that this is at least partly due to the fairly small sample of host countries covered by most previous studies. We make use of the extensive data on bilateral FDI flows collected by UNCTAD (which is largely unpublished, but available from its Data Extract Service). In this way, we avoid a sample selection bias which is likely to arise when the sample is restricted to relatively advanced host countries. Moreover, this paper is the first to address the issue of isolating the effects of BITs from the effects of unilateral regulatory changes on FDI inflows.
After reviewing the results obtained by previous studies in Section 2, we illustrate some stylized facts on both BITs and unilateral measures to liberalize the capital account in Section 3. The gravity-type model applied is presented in Section 4, where we also discuss methodological choices (notably the use of bilateral FDI flows, compared to a non-dyadic approach) as well as the data employed. Section 5 reports our main results. We find that BITs are effective in promoting FDI inflows and may even substitute for weak domestic institutions, though not for unilateral regulatory measures to promote FDI. Various robustness checks are carried out in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Analytical and Empirical Background
More than 20 years ago, Schneider and Frey (1985) found it surprising that two strands of the literature on the determinants of FDI had developed quite separately from each other: Studies stressing political factors had largely neglected economic factors, whereas studies stressing economic factors had largely neglected political factors. A similar dichotomy can still be observed even though the call by Schneider and Frey for a politico-economic model that accounts for both economic and political determinants is fairly common by now.
What recent studies tend to ignore is that policymakers in various countries have resorted to two sets of measures to attract more FDI inflows: (i) unilateral, i.e., non-binding changes in FDI-related regulations, most of which amount to a more favorable treatment of FDI, and (ii) bilateral (as well as plurilateral) treaties in which host countries have committed themselves in a legally binding way to grant foreign investors various rights that reduce uncertainty with respect to entry and exit conditions, post-entry operations as well as dispute settlement mechanisms.
Several empirical analyses focus on unilateral measures. Examples include Gastanaga et al. (1998) , Asiedu and Lien (2004) , Asiedu (2005) , Pica and Rodríguez Mora (2005) , and Desai et al. (2006) . Gastanaga et al. examine the effects of various policy measures on FDI flows, including the role of investment regulations. They employ two indicators of the degree of openness to international capital flows, both of which are constructed from the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions. Less restrictive capital controls are typically associated with higher FDI inflows (pooled data for 49 developing countries in the period . Asiedu and Lien (2004) refer to the same source, but consider three types of controls (multiple exchange rates, controls on capital account transactions, and controls with regard to export proceeds) for a broader panel of 96 developing countries in . The coefficients of all three dummy variables are statistically significant; the absence of controls on capital account transactions increases the ratio of FDI to GDP by about 0.6 percent. In a paper on FDI in Africa, Asiedu (2005) refers to the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to assess the host countries' attitude towards inward FDI. The ICRG index comprises four components: risk of operations, taxation, repatriation of profits, and labor costs. Lagged openness to FDI according to this index is shown to have positive effects on FDI in Africa. However, the coverage of this index extends well beyond capital account restrictions. The same applies to the measures of "regulatory distance" employed by Pica and Rodríguez Mora (2005) , 1 which they find to be negatively related to bilateral FDI flows. By contrast, Desai et al. (2006) focus on a more specific measure than the IMF's overall assessment of capital controls, i.e., restrictions on capital repatriation and profit remittances as provided by Shatz (2000) . When using this more specific measure, the negative effects of capital controls on FDI by US-based companies become stronger.
The few studies addressing the question whether the recent surge of BITs has helped host countries attracting more FDI typically do not take into account that unilateral liberalization of FDI regulations has proceeded at the same time.
2 When discussed at all, unilateral measures are discounted as non-binding (e.g., Neumayer and Spess 2005) . This reasoning is based on the presumption that bilateral contractual arrangements, in contrast to unilateral measures, provide a credible commitment through which time-inconsistency problems can be overcome (e.g., Vandevelde 1998; Hallward-Driemeier 2003; Elkins et al. 2006 ). Non-binding unilateral measures would be time inconsistent if the host country had an incentive to renege on earlier promises after the investment has been made.
Yet it is open to question whether the commitment through BITs is more effective than unilateral liberalization. Theoretically, BITs would be superior if attracting FDI were a onetime game. The host country could then easily renege on unilateral promises with regard to the treatment of FDI once the foreign investor realized the sunk costs associated with locating in the host country. In reality, however, attracting FDI amounts to a repeated game in which the host country strives for a continuous stream of FDI inflows from investors observing its behavior in the past. In other words, reversing unilateral liberalization once some FDI is "locked in" would come at the cost of deterring future inflows.
Moreover, Vandevelde (1998) Apart from being used deliberately as a commitment device, Elkins et al. (2006) present a "competitive model" to explain why it is rational for a host country to expect higher FDI inflows through signing BITs. Host countries face a collective action problem once it is taken into account that the conclusion of BITs involves costs for them, e.g., by relegating adjudicative authority to foreign tribunals (sovereignty costs). Host countries may be better off when collectively resisting the demand of foreign investors for BITs. For the individual host country, however, it is rational to sign BITs in order to gain reputational advantage and thereby, divert FDI away from competing host countries. 4 Especially countries competing for similar types of FDI are expected to sign BITs, in order not to place themselves at a disadvantage (see also Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2005) . However, this line of reasoning not only applies to BITs but also to unilateral FDI liberalization.
While previous empirical studies on the effects of BITs have largely in common that they do not account for unilateral FDI liberalization, their research design as well as the data used and the sample of host and source countries differ significantly. 5 Hence, it is not surprising that empirical findings have remained highly ambiguous. Hallward-Driemeier (2003) is the only study that employs bilateral FDI flows for more than one source country, as 3 Note, however, that "another -relatively small -category of BITs imposes a higher degree of discipline on the contracting parties" (UNCTAD 2007c: 155) . We return to this issue in Section 4 and discuss the resulting limitations of the dummy variable on BITs used here and in previous literature. 4 As discussed in more detail in Section 4, this argument leads us to consider the share of host country j in total FDI flows from source country i to be our preferred FDI measure when specifying the empirical model. 5 The short review of previous empirical literature is restricted to studies that focus on the effects of BITs on FDI flows to developing countries, where this issue appears to be most relevant. Some other studies concentrate on FDI relations within the OECD, or between OECD countries and a small number of East and Central European transition countries; see Egger and Merlo (2007) for a recent example. Arguably, these studies offer limited insights for policymakers in developing countries. They exclude "the very set of poor to lower middle-income and small to medium-sized developing countries, for which the conclusion of a DTT (or BIT, for that matter) can be an important instrument to woo foreign investors" (Neumayer 2007 (Neumayer : 1506 ; see also Section 4 below).
we do in this paper. 
Stylized Facts on BITs and Unilateral FDI Liberalization
The conclusion of BITs and unilateral FDI liberalization developed in unison with each other.
It is in both ways that host countries increasingly attempted to attract FDI inflows, notably Prior to 1990, unilateral capital account liberalization according to the Chinn-Ito index was largely confined to high-income OECD countries. By contrast, the 1990s witnessed a major change in capital account regulations by non-OECD countries, i.e., the host countries of FDI on which we focus in the following. Capital account liberalization in this broadly defined group of countries continued in most recent years. However, recent liberalization was restricted to the sub-group of middle-income countries. Unilateral liberalization was discontinued by the sub-group of low-income countries which, on average, still have much stricter capital account restrictions.
Taken together, the short account of trends with respect to the conclusion of BITs and unilateral regulatory changes that may help attract FDI inflows strongly suggests accounting for both sets of policy measures when assessing the effectiveness of BITs.
Method and Data
We follow large parts of the relevant literature and estimate a gravity-type model on the determinants of FDI. As noted by Deardorff (1998) (2004), as well as Portes and Rey (2005) . 13 It typically turns out that the gravity 12 We would like to thank Hiro Ito for providing access to these data. See Section 4 for a short discussion of alternative indicators of unilateral capital account liberalization. 13 However, none of these studies considers BITs to be a possible determinant of FDI.
equations for financial flows are comparable in terms of explanatory power to those for trade flows (Martin and Rey 2004: 338) . According to Portes and Rey (2005: 275) , this is hardly surprising as the gravity approach "emerges naturally" from theories of asset trade. At the same time, Shatz' (2003) analysis of US FDI reveals that sample selection matters for empirical results.
14 The basic specification of our gravity model reads as follows:
where FDI ijt stands for foreign direct investment of country i in country j in period t, FDI it for total FDI of country i in all (developing) countries included in our sample, X jt represents a set of host country control variables, Y ijt denotes the difference between source and host country characteristics, λ t is a set of year dummies, and BIT ijt corresponds to a ratified bilateral investment treaty.
We follow Hallward-Driemeier (2003) in that we use bilateral FDI flows. We overcome the critique of Neumayer and Spess (2005) concerning the limited host country coverage of previous dyadic analyses by fully exploiting the (largely unpublished) data on bilateral FDI flows available upon request from UNCTAD's Data Extract Service. As discussed in Section 2, the dyadic approach may underestimate the impact of BITs if the host country, by concluding a BIT with one source country, signals to other source countries that their FDI will be protected in the same way. However, signaling effects cannot necessarily be attributed to BITs once it is taken into account that host countries have followed a twopronged approach of unilateral FDI liberalization and bilateral commitments through BITs (Section 3). Any BIT-related signaling to third parties is no more credible than non-binding unilateral liberalization. Hence, we control for unilateral liberalization in our dyadic approach in order not to overestimate the effects of BITs on FDI inflows.
14 As noted by Shatz (2003: 118) , "national statistical agencies publish bilateral data about the investment activities of their multinationals only for host countries that have sizeable inflows of FDI. This means that nearly all research on foreign direct investment focuses on the winners, countries that have achieved at least some success in attracting FDI. This is a significant problem since policy advice is most often sought by the countries that are excluded from analysis." 15 In our empirical approach, we principally follow Carr et al. (2001) , who estimate the so-called knowledgecapital model that combines horizontal (market seeking) and vertical (efficiency seeking) FDI in a single model. We divert from the model by Carr et al. in that we use additional control variables to account for the impact of BITs on FDI. Moreover, to include as many countries as possible, we sometimes refer to slightly different control variables for which we could obtain data for a large number of developing countries. We do not include the interaction terms used by them.
As concerns the dependent variable, our preferred measure is the share of FDI attracted by a specific host country in total FDI flows from the source country under consideration to all developing host countries included in our sample. This measure captures the attractiveness of a particular developing country relatively to other developing countries.
Moreover, this FDI measure clearly relates to the theoretical model of Elkins et al. (2006) , according to which host countries sign BITs in order to divert FDI away from competing host countries. As part of our extensive robustness tests in Section 6, we employ two additional specifications of the dependent variable: FDI inflows in US$ million and FDI as a share of GDP.
Since there is a large number of zero observations for FDI at a bilateral level, we consider two variants of our preferred FDI measure, with (FDI1) or without zero observations (FDI2). It is highly likely that the missing data in our dataset are in fact zeros, since we consider FDI at a bilateral level for a long period of time. Hence, FDI1 includes missing values as zero observations even though there might be some unreported FDI figures due to confidentiality. We calculate three-year averages in order to smooth the considerable fluctuation of annual bilateral FDI flows. At the same time, this approach ensures that we have enough variation in the data. Negative FDI flows (for three-year averages) were set equal to zero to include as many observations as possible. 16 We employ a fairly standard set of controls. To begin with, we include the lagged dependent variable in all specifications to avoid the problem of autocorrelation in the panel analysis. 17 Moreover, this approach is consistent with economic theory, as FDI in the past is a strong predictor for FDI at present (Gastanaga et al. 1998) . As further control variables, we include total real host country GDP and real GDP growth for market seeking FDI (labeled GDP and Growth, respectively), host country inflation (Inflation), host country openness to trade (Openness), the difference in GDP per capita between the source and the host country for vertical FDI (DiffGDPpc), and a dummy for the existence of a bilateral or regional trading agreement, that is, a free trade agreement or customs union (RTA). 18 We expect a positive association of GDP, Growth, DiffGDPpc, and RTA with FDI; the opposite applies to Inflation, as this variable can be interpreted as a proxy for macroeconomic distortions.
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As for time invariant variables, we also closely follow the empirical literature on gravity models and incorporate dummies for a common border (ComBorder), common 16 The results hardly change if we exclude negative values. 17 Egger and Merlo (2007) 
Whereas the sign of x is unchanged, the values of x pass from a linear scale at small absolute values to a logarithmic scale at large values by using this transformation.
Institutional development of host countries, proxied by political constraints on the executive branch (PolCon), is included as a control variable as poor institutions may discourage FDI by giving rise to uncertainty (e.g., with respect to the protection of property rights; Lee and Mansfield 1996; Henisz 2000) and additional costs (e.g., in the case of corruption; Wei 2000) . We use the index for political constraints that has been developed by Henisz (2000) . In contrast to alternative institutional indicators, this variable is available for a large number of countries and years. PolCon focuses on the political discretion of the executive branch. Less discretion is supposed to render credible commitments to (foreign) investors more likely. The indicator ranges from zero (total political discretion) to one (no political discretion). Thus, we expect a positive link between PolCon and FDI flows.
In contrast to earlier studies, we mitigate the omitted variable bias by controlling for unilateral regulatory changes that may have an impact on FDI flows. Note that unilateral regulatory changes typically apply to FDI from all sources in the same way. We use the model to account for the fact that the sample includes a large number of zero observations (FDI1); the PPML estimator includes the above mentioned time-invariant variables.
In the next step, we account for possible endogeneity. While ratifying a BIT could increase FDI flows to a developing country, we cannot rule out reverse causality. Above all, investors might press their government to ratify BITs with host countries in which they are heavily engaged, though feeling insecure regarding, for example, expropriation or the repatriation of profits. Neumayer and Spess (2005) lag BITs by one period to mitigate potential reverse causality, but dismiss instrumental variable (IV) regressions for lack of appropriate instruments. One period lags can be problematic, especially when using annual data as in Neumayer and Spess (2005) . Hallward-Driemeier (2003) The FDI data for financial offshore centers are highly likely to be biased. We exclude all countries that are on the list of offshore financial centers as reported by Eurostat (2005) . 26 See Appendix C and Appendix D for the source and host country sample.
Main Results
Following the model specification and the introduction of the variables, we now turn to the empirical results. We start with the fixed-effects technique and focus, for a start, on FDI1
(columns 1 to 4 in Table 1 ). In Model I, we include all relevant control variables except
CapOpen. 27 As expected, FDI in the previous period is a strong predictor for FDI in the current period. Likewise, FDI is clearly flowing to larger and growing markets (marking seeking, or horizontal FDI), as the coefficients for both the size and the growth of the host country market are positive and highly significant at the 1 per cent level. The same applies to the difference in GDP per capita between source and host countries (vertical FDI), though the significance level is lower in comparison to horizontal FDI. The estimated coefficients of Inflation, RTA and PolCon have the expected signs but fail to reach conventional significance levels. Likewise, openness to trade is not significantly associated with FDI inflows.
Finally, the BIT variable has a positive coefficient and is significant at the 5 per cent level, meaning that having a BIT ratified with the source country is associated with an increase in FDI flows to the host country. Concerning the economic impact, some peculiarities have to be taken into account. According to Kennedy (1981) , the impact g* of a dummy variable on a dependent variable that enters the empirical model as a logarithm would have to be approximated appropriately as follows: Next we consider the possibility that the impact of BITs may depend on major characteristics of the host country by including interaction terms of institutional development (PolCon) and capital account openness (CapOpen) with the BIT variable (Models III and IV).
This allows us to test whether BITs might act as a complement or substitute for unilateral improvements in institutions and the degree of capital account openness. In column 3, PolCon turns out to be significantly positive while the interaction term PolCon*BIT is negative (and highly significant at the 1 per cent level). This suggests that BITs may substitute for institutional quality in the host country. The evidence is considerably weaker for the second interaction term, CapOpen*BIT; the sign of the coefficient is also negative, but clearly fails to pass the conventional 10 per cent significance level. The BIT variable, on the other hand, is always positive and significant at the 10 per cent level or better.
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29 Overall, our sample consists of 14,077 observations and 2,301 country pairs, that is, more than four times as many country pairs as used by Hallward-Driemeier (2003) , who employed 537 pairs. 30 As noted below, CapOpen is positive and highly significant if we use FDI2 or other econometric methods. 31 Note the increase in the size of the coefficient for BIT from Models I and II to Model III. This is mainly due to the fact that we add the interaction term. To get the net impact of a ratification of a BIT, we would have to take
In the remaining four columns of Still, it can be argued that the inclusion of a large number of zeros in FDI1 might bias the outcome, since ordinary least squares (OLS) might not be the appropriate estimation technique for this sample. To account for this fact, we employ the PPML estimator that has been suggested for gravity trade models by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . Unlike the OLS method, the PPML estimator is consistent even in the presence of heteroskedasticity and it will not ignore zero FDI flows. 32 By using this econometric method, we are also able to include various timeinvariant indicators, which might be important for bilateral FDI, but have been captured by the country fixed effects in the previous model. We use the same four model specifications (Models I to IV) as before, but focus on FDI1 only. As can be seen in Table 2 , all previously used control variables have the expected sign, and are highly significant except for Inflation and RTA. Having better institutions and a liberalized capital account is now strongly associated with higher FDI inflows. There is also strong evidence with respect to the four additional control variables. Having a common border, speaking the same language, and having colonial ties are positively associated with FDI flows. For the distance between two countries, we get a negative coefficient. Accordingly, the increase in management and transport costs due to the distance between two countries is of higher importance than the the estimated coefficient for the interaction term into account too. The overall impact in this specification (and all other specifications in the following) is always positive and significant, which has been confirmed by an appropriate F-test. 32 We also employed a Tobit model to examine the robustness of the results. Importantly, the BIT variable remains positive and highly significant.
attraction of investing in a remote country to serve that market through FDI and local production.
Importantly, independent of the model specification, BIT is always positive and significant at the 1 per cent level. Similar to the OLS fixed-effects estimation, the first interaction term maintains its negative coefficient and is highly significant, whereas the interaction term CapOpen*BIT is not significant. In all four models and for both FDI variables (FDI1 and FDI2) , we find that the coefficient of the BIT variable remains positive and significant, in most cases at the 5 or 1 per cent level. The GMM approach thus corroborates that ratifying a BIT with a source country leads to higher FDI inflows from that country. 35 The estimated coefficients of BIT are always larger in the instrumental regressions in comparison to the fixed-effects estimation. This outcome might be surprising, since the presumed reverse causality in the latter approach would mean that we should obtain lower estimates in the GMM regressions. The fixed-effects estimates are determined by the association between FDI and BITs, while the GMM estimates are determined by the partial association between FDI and the component of BIT correlated with the instruments. Therefore, technically speaking, the fact that the fixed-effects estimates are smaller means that the partial association of FDI with the instruments is weaker than its partial association with the component that is correlated.
Arguably, this outcome is because the fixed-effects estimates are biased downwards (rather than upwards). If there is a signaling effect of BITs beyond the signatory parties, as speculated by Neumayer and Spess (2005) , the BIT variable may underestimate the impact on FDI. Consequently, the fixed-effects estimates would understate the impact of BITs on bilateral FDI inflows, whereas the GMM estimates do not suffer from this bias and are, thus, more reliable.
Sensitivity Tests
We check the robustness of our main findings by using several additional model specifications. In view of space constraints, we focus on the GMM regressions and only report the coefficients for the BIT variable with FDI1 as the dependent variable. 36 First, we exclude RTA. Recall that we controlled for regional trade agreements since they increasingly include FDI-related prescriptions, thus reducing investor uncertainty. Hence, the isolated impact of BITs should be biased upwards if RTAs are ignored. This expectation turns out to be true, even though RTA always remained insignificant before. The coefficient of BIT, reported in Table 4 , is slightly larger when replicating the estimations without RTA. Third, the size of the BIT coefficient also declines slightly when excluding resourceintensive host countries. This is surprising since the availability of natural resources in host countries could be expected to provide such a strong incentive to foreign companies that they care less about protection of resource-seeking FDI. While our results do not support this view, they are subject to some qualifications. The data situation is far from perfect. The World Bank criterion we use for classifying resource-intensive host countries 38 is not available for various countries of our sample. This may affect results especially because some countries in which FDI is fairly likely to be resource-seeking could not be classified (e.g., Azerbaijan, Equatorial Guinea, or Kazakhstan). Moreover, foreign companies are most likely to be rather lenient about protection in the case of oil. However, many oil-exporting countries are not included in 36 All GMM robustness checks reported in this section have also been performed for the fixed-effects and PPML models as well as for FDI2. As the sign and significance levels of the coefficients are quite similar, we do not report them. Like all other non-reported results, they can be obtained from the first author upon request. 37 For reference, we show previous GMM estimates for the full sample in the first row of Table 4 . 38 We classify a country as resource-intensive if its r esource rents , that is, energy plus mineral depletion in per cent of GNI, are higher than 15 per cent in the first three-year period (1978) (1979) (1980) . See the notes below Table 4 for all resource-intensive countries that have been excluded in this set of regressions. our sample of host countries, as the required data for the independent variables are not available.
Fourth, we run separate estimations for low and middle-income host countries. The BIT variable retains its positive impact for both sub-groups. 39 The effects turn out to be somewhat stronger for middle-income host countries. This appears to be reasonable as relatively advanced developing countries are better able to make use of FDI-specific assets, for example, by infringing on property rights. Hence, there is greater uncertainty for foreign companies in host countries with higher imitative capacity. The link between credible protection through BITs and FDI inflows is therefore likely to be stronger than in countries with less imitative capacity. Yet, the interaction term PolCon*BIT is negative and significant for both sub-groups (not reported), which suggests that the substitution effect holds for both low-and middle-income countries.
Fifth, the picture remains essentially the same when our estimations are based on a shorter period of observation (1990-2004, instead of 1978-2004) . The size of coefficients is quite similar compared to the complete period, only in Model III do we obtain a lower to earlier times, the conclusion of a BIT is no longer a distinctive factor signaling a particular host country's readiness to offer favorable FDI conditions. Rather, foreign companies may increasingly tend to regard BITs as a standard feature of the institutional framework governing FDI worldwide.
Sixth, we perform separate estimations for developed and developing source countries. include as many source countries as possible, as we do in this paper, to avoid any bias due to country-specific effects and to provide a comprehensive assessment of the impact of BITs on FDI.
In a final set of robustness checks, we use two alternative FDI measures, that is, bilateral FDI flows in million US$ (FDI3) and in per cent of the host country's GDP (FDI4). 41 As can be seen in Table 5 , the BIT variable is always significant in all four model specifications and for all three econometric methods. The significance levels are somewhat lower if we use FDI flows as a share of the host country's GDP as the dependent variable. 41 To save space, we continue to only report the results with zero observations for FDI flows included.
This outcome might be due to the fact the GDP stands on both sides of the question, which could lead to less reliable estimates for the explanatory variables.
In summary, our robustness checks strongly support our basic message that BITs help attract FDI to developing host countries, even though the size and significance level of coefficients differ somewhat across different specifications.
Conclusions
Policymakers in almost all developing countries are engaged in fierce competition for FDI.
However, it has remained disputed how effective the means are that national policymakers have at their disposal when attempting to attract FDI inflows. In this paper, we focus on the impact of BITs that have increasingly been concluded in order to reduce uncertainty of foreign investors in a credible way and, thus, to promote FDI flows to developing countries.
Few earlier studies have addressed the effectiveness of BITs, and the available empirical evidence is inconclusive. Depending on the particular study, we argue that previous evaluations of the effectiveness of BITs are distorted due to sample selection and omitted variable biases as well as the potential endogeneity of BITs in the regressions. We attempt to overcome these econometric concerns by covering a much larger sample of host and source countries, by accounting for unilateral FDI liberalization, and by including an appropriate instrumental variable approach.
Our main finding is that BITs do promote FDI flows to developing countries. This result is fairly robust across various models. Moreover, the significantly positive effect of BITs on bilateral FDI flows holds for FDI flows from developed source countries to various sub-samples of developing host countries. BITs may even substitute for weak local institutions, though not for unilateral FDI-related liberalization measures.
All this suggests that policymakers in developing countries have resorted to an effective means to promote FDI by concluding BITs. Nevertheless, our analysis leaves several questions for future research. It depends not only on the benefits in terms of higher FDI inflows but also on the costs involved whether ratifying still more BITs would be rational.
Costs may arise by reducing the policy options host countries might want to consider in selecting FDI projects at the entry stage and in regulating approved FDI projects after entry.
In particular, it remains open to debate whether host countries have reason to feel unduly constrained given that recent BITs have become more binding and broader in coverage.
Concerns are that recent BITs have shifted the balance towards the interests of profit maximizing foreign investors and away from the developmental interests of host countries.
This calls for a detailed evaluation of the contents of BITs, rather than only focusing on the number of BITs.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of more BITs to come will be affected by several factors. On the one hand, as argued by Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2006) But it is not only with regard to BITs that heterogeneity should be taken into account.
The same may be required with respect to the dependent FDI variable. For instance, Gallagher and Birch (2006) suspect that BITs have been a more effective means of FDI promotion in South America than in Mesoamerica because of the different types of FDI attracted by the two sub-regions. Arguably, the protection of FDI through BITs is more relevant for horizontal, market-seeking FDI which stands in direct competition with local companies than for vertical, efficiency-seeking FDI. Future research may also explore in more detail the links between sector-specific BIT provisions, e.g., with regard to services, and sector-specific FDI flows.
Data constraints may render it impossible to address such questions in panel studies; but country-specific studies may offer detailed insights to this effect. t-values, reported in parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity; due to space constraints, the coefficients for the year dummies are not shown; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
